different from the Judeo-Christian religions the first amendment was designed to protect.
14 On its face, this interrogatory indicates that a Native American religion would be excluded from the intended protection of the first amendment. This, however, would seem to be unlikely considering the purpose behind constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion. The purpose was to protect such an exercise of religion from being unreasonably controlled by the government," a situation in England that helped prompt the early settlement of the United States by colonists rebelling against such religious restrictions. Thus, the motivation behind this constitutional guarantee would indicate that perhaps the first amendment might be more liberally extended to protect Native American religious beliefs.
Related to Culture
Another argument for the right to wear a traditional Indian hair style centers upon the cultural significance of such a right. Although each tribe or group of Indians should be considered individually, generally, the traditional style of long, braided hair was a common cultural characteristic among the many different Indian tribes.' 0 Although there is no legally recognized right to preserve and assert a particular cultural heritage, there have been several arguments supporting the idea of allowing Indians to follow traditional cultural practices even while in such controlled environments as school or prison. One of these arguments covers the possible detrimental effects stemming from regulations that discourage any display of cultural pride such as wearing a traditional Indian hair style.
In the schools, the effects of policies directed at suppressing and discouraging Indian culture and tradition have often resulted in Indian student frustration and alienation, along with a loss of pride, initiative, and identity. 17 This consequence is reported not only as a personal observation, but as a statistical fact throughout the transcripts of the hearings before the United States Senate Special Subcommittee on Indian Education, 8 as well as in the report of that subcommittee.' 9 The findings of the subcommittee illustrate that the enforcement of such school hair style regulations prohibiting the wearing of a traditional Indian hair style 0 in effect results in defeating an often claimed justification for those hair codes. This justification, espoused by some school officials and recognized by at least one court, 2 ' supports enforcement of appearance codes by arguing that such regulations encourage the state objective of instilling pride and initiative among students, leading to scholastic achievement. The results of the hearings point out, however, that instead of instilling pride in Indian students, the policies frustrate pride and discourage motivation. This detrimental effect is recognized among Indian prison inmates, and as contributing significantly to at least one Indian inmate's problems which led to his incarceration, 22 as well as being counterproductive to the rehabilitation goals of modem prisons. 23 In light of these undesirable effects caused by a seemingly innocuous appearance code, a practical problem arises as to developing and enforcing a hair code that would not harmfully affect any ethnic or racial groups. A suggested solution to this problem would be either to have no hair style regulations at all or to develop an "appearance" code that does not restrict any appearance reflecting a person's ethnic or racial culture, possibly by providing reasonable exceptions appropriate for the groups represented in a particular school or prison population.
Recognition of Indian culture is further encouraged in a discussion of the effect of the current growing interest in cultural patterns and values of America's past and the relevance it should have to Indian culture. 4 After noting that the objective of preserving cultural values in the United States presents the question of whose cultural values, the authors go on to comment, in reference to a congressional act dealing with cultural preservation, 25 that "[t]he declaration of Congress that the 'historical and cultural foundations of the nation' should be preserved in order 'to give a sense of orientation to the American people' is inclusive. It speaks to and of all Americans-not only white Americans but... American Indians as well." 20 Another cultural argument for allowing Indians to wear traditional hair styles involves the claim that the first amendment protection for freedom of speech 27 extends to actions that so specifically convey a particular message that they can be considered analogous to speech. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 2 8 the Supreme Court recognized that the wearing of black armbands by students in protest of the Viet Nam War was an expression closely akin to pure speech and was entitled to first amendment protection.
-
A case even more in point with these Indian rights issues is Braxton v. Board of Public Instruction," where a Florida court found that the first amendment protected a black school teacher's right to wear a beard as "an appropriate expression of his heritage, culture, and racial pride. 3 1 In accordance with the lines of reasoning in Tinker and Braxton, the wearing of long braided hair has been claimed to be a definite expression of pride in being an Indian 32 and, therefore, is also entitled to protection under the first amendment. The wearing of a traditional American Indian hair style, viewed as an attempt to convey a distinct and specific message, can be distinguished from other "school hair-length" cases denying the wearing of long hair as merely a broad symbol of general discontent, rather than as a sign of a particular communication. 33 Thus, the wearing of a traditional hair style as part of an Indian's cultural heritage and as a clear expression of that culture can legitimately be argued to be protected under the first amendment through application of the decisions of Tinker and Braxton.
The foregoing seems to give support to a view that Native Americans should be allowed to wear traditional hair styles. The goal of institutions such as schools and prisons for the development of selfworth would be furthered by such tolerance.
However, a contrary view arguing against the recognition of different cultures in public schools should be mentioned. That view contends that an integrated school system cannot favor different ethnic and racial groups and remain one organization. 84 While, on its face, this position may seem to have a logical and practical strength, it nevertheless seems contrary to the accepted idea that one of the functions of American education is to provide exposure to and exchange of many different ideas. 35 One of the acknowledged conclusions of the landmark school desegregation case, Brown Y. Board of Education," 0 was that "only by amalgamating children of various races, colors, cultural, ethical, and environmental backgrounds can the public schools become the effective 'market place of ideas' for the benefit of all students. 37 As justice Douglas observed in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,3 s "our constitutional system repudiates the idea that a state may conduct its school 'to foster a homogeneous people.' ,' Finally, Keyishan v. Board of Regents 40 further emphasized the importance of education, including a wide exposure to many different views. 41 
Court Decisions
There are four reported cases concerning the wearing of a traditional Indian hair style by an American Indian. 42 They deal with challenges to school or prison dress and hair regulations 43 with the Indians asserting primarily their religious right, and secondarily, their cultural right to wear a traditional Indian hair style. This tendency to focus on the religious issue is based on the legal strength of the first amendment right to free exercise of religion, 44 while the culturally based arguments lack such a legal basis. 45 Furthermore, any legal acknowledgment of cultural customs is usually related to a religion, and culture itself is not really challenged except in its connection with religious beliefs. 46 Two of the reported cases deal with American Indian students' hair length and public schools' appearance codes. In New Rider v. Board of Education, 47 three Pawnee Indian junior high school students claimed the prerogative of wearing traditional Indian hair styles in violation of the school's hair code 48 as part of their freedom of religion right, 49 as well as part of other rights protected under the first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution." Although substantial evidence was presented on the freedom of religion right argument, 51 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals never really discussed that issue specifically. The court affirmed the trial court's reversal of its original holding 2 and found that no substantial constitutional questions were presented by the students' attack on the hair regulation.
The appeals court, relying on several other prior holdings, 53 went on to state that the regulation and management of state schools should be left in the hands of the school authorities and state courts, and that a federal court should avoid getting involved with the operations of a state's public school system unless the exercise of a constitutional right is impinged. The court skirted the religious exercise issue during its argument, negating the free speech issue by citing as authority an earlier non-Indian student hair-length case, Freeman v. Flake. 4 The court pointed out that it recognized that Freeman specifically did not concern a claim of any racial or religious discrimination, and that although the New Rider students argued this distinction, the decision in Freeman would be reaffirmed. This indicated that although the Freeman holding concerned only the first amendment right of free speech, the precedent would apply equally to any other first amendment rights. 5 5 In other words, the decision implied that because it has been held that long hair is not protected under the freedom of speech clause of the first amendment, it follows that long hair, even though related to religion and racial heritage, also is not protected under the freedom of religion clause of the first amendment. Finally, after balancing the claimed constitutional right and the public interest, 56 the court further found that the hair code involved in this case 57 bore a rational relationship to the state objective of "instilling pride and initiative among the students leading to scholarship attainment and high school spirit and morale," as well as helping maintain order and discipline in operation of the school."' As discussed earlier, it is somewhat irrational to believe that pride and initiative can be instilled in American Indian students by forbidding the wearing of a traditional Indian hair style which in fact is claimed to be an expression of pride in their culture and heritage 5 9
Hatch v. Goerke 0 varies from the other cases in that the challengers of the school's hair regulation"' were the student's parents. The plaintiffs, the mother being an American Indian, argued generally that the enforcement of the code infringed on their rights to rear their children according to their own religious, cultural, and moral values. In this case, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals partly answered the religious freedom question in finding an important distinction between this case and that of Wisconsin v. Yoder.1 2 Yoder allowed Amish parents to withdraw their children from compulsory public education after a certain grade on the basis that such continued education created conflicts with the basic religious tenets and practices of the Amish faith. 63 In distinguishing Hatch from Yoder, the court found that the school appearance regulations in this case did not create a clash with religious beliefs like the all-encompassing, religiously based concept of rearing children recognized in Yoder. However, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, as in New Rider, again avoided addressing the religious freedom question fully by once more relying on such decisions as Freeman,6 with additional authority this time of the New Rider decision which reaffirmed Freeman. Based on those decisions, the federal court abstained from getting involved in state operations of public schools, leaving the regulation of student hair length to be handled through state procedures.65
The other two cases in this area concern the reforcement of prison hair regulations against inmates. United States ex rel. Goings v. Aaron 66 deals with an Oglala Sioux Indian inmate's right to wear long hair as part of his religion and culture. However, the decision in this case deals more with the importance of the inmate's taking of a "Ceremonial Indian Vow" to be more religious, with the plaintiff claiming that to force him to cut his hair would break his vow and subject him to serious consequences. Opposing evidence was presented as to the beliefs surrounding the severity of breaking such a vow. 67 The Minnesota District Court decided that since the prisoner was being released in 55 days from the time of the decision, he could just renew the vow after his release, but that until his release, he would be subject to the prison regulations. 8 Thus, the court treated the issue as moot and chose to enforce the prison regulations in keeping with the majority of cases on prison regulations and constitutional rights. 69 Moreover, the court found that the evidence presented indicated a lack of sincerity in Goings' recently acquired religious beliefs.
7 0 In contrast, the more recent decision of Teterud v. Gillman found that the Indian inmate's sincerity in his also recently awakened religious beliefs was not sufficiently contradicted by the evidence and the court seemed to apply a more lenient standard. 7 Finally, in balancing the interests in Goings, the court found that even if the prisoner had had a sincere religious belief, his religious freedom, as in most cases with non-Indian inmates,7 2 is subject to reasonable limitations in the prison environment. 73 The most recent case, Teterud v. Gillman, 74 discusses and answers the religious rights question in more depth and more directly 75 than any of the other three cases. Interestingly enough, this case is the only one that recognizes any rights of an American Indian to wear a traditional hair style in a case concerning a one-half Cree Indian inmate's challenge to the enforcement of the Iowa State Penitentiary's hair regulation against himself and other American Indian inmates. Under the Supreme Court's definition of religious beliefs followed in United States v. Seeger,7 6 the Iowa court here concluded that Teterud's religious views came within that interpretation and constituted a valid religion worthy of recognition.
7 7 Based on evidence emphasizing various religious and cultural functions that an Indian's traditional hair style could fulfill, 78 the court found that hair plays a central role in a religion of the Plains Indians 79 and that therefore "[a]n Indian's hair length can have a sufficient religious significance to make a forced cutting of that hair an encroachment on the Indian's First Amendment rights." 80 Acknowledging Teterud's sincerity in his beliefs, the court further held that "if an individual Indian's belief in the Indian Religion is honest, made in good faith, and sincere, he should be allowed to wear his hair in the traditional style."' ' Unlike most other prison hair code cases, 8 2 this decision held that the enforcement of the particular prison hair regulations against Teterud was not justified on the grounds that 'long hair was unsanitary, created hazards around machinery, increased difficulty in identifying inmates, or could hide contraband. 8 1 3 Finally, after reviewing Goings and New Rider, the court in Teterud specifically disagreed with those holdings and went on to declare that Teterud's "interest in wearing the traditional Indian hair style is predicated upon a sincere religious belief which must be constitutionally protected." 8
Religious Aspects
A review of the cases points out that in focusing on the religious aspects of the four cases, there are similarities as well as distinctions. The two school-related cases, New Rider and Hatch, basically decided the issue of protection under the first amendment freedom of religion clause, finding no solid claim of constitutional restraint. 8 8 The decisions in New Rider and Hatch both relied on an earlier non-Indian student hair-length case that did not involve religious or racial issues at all, with New Rider implying that freedom of expression and freedom of religious exercise are essentially the same issue. As discussed previously, the court in New Rider indicated that since Freeman had held long hair not to be protected under the first amendment free speech clause, then long hair was not protected under the freedom of religion clause either, regardless of any distinctions. 86 The two prison cases show more distinction in their decisions. Dealing with the religious issue, Goings found no protection under the first amendment because the prisoner's newly acquired religious beliefs were not considered by the court to be sincere. On the other hand, the Teterud decision held that, based on the evidence, the inmate's religious beliefs were valid, sincere, and entitled to constitutional protection under the first amendment freedom of religion clause.
Since Teterud is the only case that recognizes a religious right to wear a traditional Indian hair style, it is understandable that it varies in several ways from the other three cases. Teterud is the only decision that found the hair regulations not to satisfy the claimed justification. In contrast, Goings found that religious freedom was subject to reasonable rules of conduct in and out of prison. 88 As discussed supra, New Rider held that the hair code was in keeping with the state's school objective of instilling pride, encouraging scholarship and morale, and maintaining discipline.Y 9 The Hatch decision merely found that the regulation did not create a clash with any significant religious beliefs, and thus should be enforced. 0 Both the plaintiffs in New Rider and the plaintiff in Teterud presented evidence as to the interrelatedness of religion and the traditional Indian hair style as well as to other daily activitiesY 1 The court in New Rider hesitated to recognize such an all-encompassing religion 92 and found the evidence to be insufficient in supporting the validity of that belief. In Teterud, the court disagreed with New Rider and found the belief of an interrelation between religion and the daily aspects of living to be valid, sincere, and worthy of constitutional protection, according to the evidence presented which was very similar in theory to the evidence offered in New Rider 3 
Cultural Aspects
As indicated before, it is difficult to separate the acknowledgment of culture or the lack of it from religious rights. 9 4 Although this is true in the four cases dealt with, there are some distinguishable cultural aspects.
Hatch is the only one of the four that specifically includes cultural values in the alleged rights asserted by the plaintiff parents, and then it is only generally included in the broad allegations 95 with no substantial argument discussed or answered in the court's decision. In comparison, the plaintiffs in New Rider did not specifically allege a cultural right, but a subtle claim was included incidental to the other issues, particularly the right to religious exercise. 6 Goings dealt with some cultural aspects in focusing part of the discussion on Goings' taking of a "Ceremonial Indian Vow" to return to the old Indian traditions and religion. 97 Finally, in contrast to the other cases, the decision in Teterud seemed to deal more directly with cultural rights because the court determined one of the issues to be "whether or not an Indian's cultural and traditional beliefs constitute a religion... ,,"98 but this was again in connection with religion. However, the court goes beyond the religious point in saying that an Indian may wish to wear a traditional hair style for a variety of reasons, and it is not the court's duty to speculate as to the reasons. 99 The court qualifies this in relation to religious beliefs by stating that as long as an Indian's belief in an Indian religion is in good faith, honest, and sincere, that Indian should be allowed to wear a traditional hair style. 00 Nevertheless, none of these cases seem to clearly recognize any cultural rights separately from religious rights as justifying an Indian's wearing his hair in a traditional style.
There does seem to be some legal recognition of a cultural right that should be acknowledged, at least as argued in the dissent to the denial of certiorari in New Rider. 1 1 That dissent, along with other sources such as the hearings before the United States Senate Special Subcommittee on Indian Education' 0 2 and the report of that subcommittee, 1 0 3 recognized the detrimental effect of suppressing Indian culture 0 4 and, therefore, in addition to other reasons, 05 encouraged the acknowledgment and allowance of an Indian cultural right to wear a traditional hair style. However, this was a dissent and only represents a legal minority. Nevertheless, there was similar evidence presented and recognized in Teterud' 0 6 which indicated at least a stronger minority opinion which could become that of the majority.
Conclusion
Although the majority of court decisions hold that an Indian has no constitutionally protected rights to wear a traditional Indian hair style as part of a cultural heritage or a religious belief, the holding in Teterud, plus the dissent opinion in New Rider, indicate the possible beginnings of a change in attitude. Furthermore, arguments expressing the importance of a right to a cultural expression and traditional identity encourage the recognition of less prohibitive attitudes toward allowing Indians to show pride in their specific cultures and to freely exercise their traditional religions. Following these modes of thinking, perhaps Indians in the future will be allowed or even encouraged to wear traditional hair styles as the exercise of a cultural and/or religious right. 9. This disagreement is illustrated by contrasting evidence presented in several of the cases concerned. In Teterud, an anthropologist testified to the interrelatedness of the Plains Indians' religion and daily lives, and pointed out that one of the spiritual customs of these Indians is to cut off their hair to show grief or humility after a close https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol4/iss1/8 relative has died. Another anthropologist, noting that long braided hair was a traditional Cree custom, explained the importance of the physical appearance of the Cree Indians in relation to spiritual matters, stating that the Cree would unbraid their hair on very serious religious occasions. While in contrast to this, a fullblooded Yankton Sioux Indian testified that male Indians' hair length was a matter of individual preference, and noted that her experiences attending many Indian religious ceremonies across the United States indicated that Indian males do not necessarily wear long hair in those ceremonies. Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153, 155 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
NOTES
In Goings, the petitioners testified that although the Indian inmates met regularly to discuss Indian culture and to engage in religious services, he was the only one wearing long hair. In addition, an Oglala Sioux testified that as a former military pilot, he had had short hair and that he annually participated in religious ceremonies. United States ex rel. Goings v. Aaron, 35o F. Supp. i (D. Minn. 1972) .
In New Rider, an anthropologist testified as to the religious and cultural significance of long braided hair as well as the frequently reported warrior style of a hair ridge among the Pawnees. She explained that not only was the hair style traditional, but it was related to specific Pawnee dance and religious beliefs that everything a Pawnee does each day has religious significance. While, on the one hand, another anthropologist and author also testified that the Pawnee culture and religion are highly integrated with most of the tribal practices and traditions, she went on to say this did not include a particular custom of wearing long braided hair. 11. An Oglala Sioux Indian testified that "a vow of the type petitioner had taken ... was certain to be important to petitioner, particularly in view of the Indian teachings that to break a vow of this sort would make him fearful that great misfortune would be nearly certain to follow." In contrast to this, a Jewish rabbi, aware of the tradition of long hair in Judaism, testified that a broken vow to cut one's hair could be renewed and such would in effect amount to a reinstatement. 35o F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. Minn. 1972) .
12. SPENCER ET AL., STOUTENBURCH, TERRELL, and WISSLER, supra note 2; Dr. William Bittle, professor of anthropology, University of Oklahoma; Ms. Judy Jordon, anthropologist specializing in American Indian studies. Dr. Bittle also suggested that the scalplock, sometimes with an amulet braided into it, which was worn by some Indians, could be considered religious in a very broad sense, but that hair style was really tied in with the warrior status and war.
13. See cases cited in note 2 supra. 14. This was included in the petition for writ of certiorari made by the plaintiffs in New Rider that was denied at 414 U.S. 1097 (1973 2o. The hair regulation concerned in New Rider was that "Hair should have no odd coloring or style. It should be tapered or blocked in the back and cannot touch the shirt collar or ears and should be one-fourth inch above the eyebrows; sideburns must be no lower than the earlobe and face clean shaven . . ." 48o F.zd 693, 695 (1oth Cir. 1973).
The hair code involved in Hatch included a provision that boys' hair should be kept trim and neatly groomed and should not extend below the eyebrows or the collar. 502 F.zd 1189, 1191 (loth Cir. 1974) .
21. In New Rider, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized the testimony of Marvin Stokes, Superintendent of Schools at Byng, Okla., on the relationship between compliance with similar school dress-hair regulations and scholarship attainment, as well as instilling pride and initiative in students and found that "the hair code regulation bears a rational relationship to a state objective, i.e., that of instilling pride and initiative among the students leading to scholarship attainment and high school spirit and morale." 48o F.2d 69o, 697 (loth Cir. 1973).
22. In Teterud v. Gillman, the psychiatrist that treated Teterud, the Cree Indian inmate, described him "when he first came for treatment as having a passive-aggressive personality which was based in part upon childhood rejection, including feeling of being 'unworthy as an Indian' and being 'just another God-damn Indian Kid.'" Furthermore, in accordance with the view that an Indian should be allowed to recognize his culture rather than perpetuating policies of suppression, "Dr. Johnson advised Teterud that his low opinion of himself could change and that he should 'start taking pride in being a red man, or an Indian, as opposed to feeling bad about it.' " 385 F.
Supp. 153, 155 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
23. In Teterud, "Dr. Johnson further testified that the compelled cutting of Teterud's hair would generally be counter-productive to rehabilitation and, therefore, that the cutting of Teterud's hair would have no beneficial effect." Other testimony in this case pointed out the positive effect instilling racial and cultural pride had on successful rehabilitation among inmates that are members of minority groups.
"Robert Sarver, the former Commissioner of Corrections of Arkansas and West Virginia, testified that from the standpoint of criminology and penology, the instilling of racial and cultural pride in a member of a racial minority would be an important factor in successful rehabilitation. 42. Cited at note 2, supra, and the subjects of this note. 43. The hair regulation concerned in New Rider was that "[h]air should have no odd coloring or style. It should be tapered or blocked in the back and cannot touch the shirt collar or ears and should be one-fourth inch above the eyebrows; sideburns must be no lower than the earlobe and face clean shaven.
48o F.2d 693, 695 (loth Cir. 1973).
The hair code in Hatch included a provision that boys' hair should be kept trim and neatly groomed and should not extend below the eyebrows or the collar. 502 F.2d 1189, 1191 (loth Cir. 1974).
The hair code concerned in Goings was "....
[h]air cuts must be in accordance with the following guidelines: Hair must not extend over the ears on the sides, over the collar in the back, over the eyebrows in the front. 44. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 45. However, it could be broadly argued that under the fourteenth amendment, a freedom or liberty to follow a traditional culture cannot be deprived without due process of law and that as part of the equal protection of the law, an Indian has just much right to follow his cultural beliefs as do other Americans of the more recognized Judeo-Christian religions and cultures: "... nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 
